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Abstract 
 
Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) is the dominant theme of proposed 
changes to UK defence acquisition, but progress has been hindered by a lack of 
agreed interpretations for key concepts.  This paper provides some clarity for 
Capability, Network Enabled Capability (NEC), TLCM, and Affordability and notes, 
in particular, the fractal nature of capability.   
 
Through stakeholder analysis and concept maps, we identify some of the major 
challenges associated with TLCM.  These include affordability (which is the 
motivation for TLCM but may also be its stumbling block); the increased priority of 
agility, adaptability, and flexibility in capability planning; and the need for 
appropriate TLCM metrics.  The lack of an explicit learning mechanism within the 
capability planning process is also a major deficiency, because TLCM relies on 
effective knowledge management. 
 
The changing role of industry is considered and the need for an holistic view of 
capability is emphasised.    
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last few years, several significant policy documents have been published by the 
UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) that propose radical changes in approach to 
acquisition and management of defence capability.  These include the Defence 
Industrial Strategy1 and Network Enabled Capability2.  Following on from these, the 
Enabling Acquisition Change Report3 sets out specific recommendations for 
responses required from the community that plans and develops military capabilities.  
The key theme is the implementation of Through Life Capability Management (we 
shall use the acronym TLCM hereafter), which puts a premium on ensuring that: 
….military capability is built from the most cost-effective mix of 
components, and is both affordable to operate through life and readily 
adaptable3.   
Because of the novelty of TLCM, there exists much confusion and numerous 
interpretations of the concepts and processes.  This paper provides an holistic view of 
UK military capability development by articulating a detailed understanding of what 
TLCM means for defence capability planning, development, and delivery.  It will also 
set the scene for, and provide an appreciation of, the wider context for future TLCM 
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related researches.  We first explore the meanings of some key concepts, and then 
identify stakeholders and suggest a system boundary.  We then describe the 
conceptual TLCM process and suggest responsibilities among the stakeholders.  
Finally, we summarise some of the key implications discussed in the paper. 
  
 
Exploration of the meanings of key concepts 
 
This section explores four key concepts in the domain: Capability, Network Enabled 
Capability (NEC), TLCM, and Affordability. 
 
Capability 
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the core meaning of capability is 
“power or ability to do something” with a subsense of “an undeveloped or unused 
faculty”.  Latency is, thus, an important feature of capability.  Another feature 
becomes apparent when it is considered from a systems perspective.  Capability exists 
in all levels of the hierarchy of a system or components of a system.  It is failure to 
appreciate this feature that has led to misunderstandings when capability is discussed.  
We may describe capability as being fractal, in the sense of having a ‘family 
resemblance’ at all the various levels, but without being precisely similar at all those 
levels4.  Strictly, the term fractal implies possession of the same statistical 
characteristics at all levels; but in this case we mean to imply similar characteristics.  
This fractal nature of capability implies that capability is only a meaningful concept 
when it is specified about whose, to do what, and under what circumstances.  That is 
to say firstly that capability is context dependent, but also that the context description 
contains information about the level at which capability is being considered.  For 
instance, a single UAV and a net-enabled surveillance capability, that includes many 
sensor bearing assets, special forces, etc., can both be described as surveillance 
capability, but the single UAV could also be part of the net-enabled capability.  i.e. 
they are at different levels.  Nevertheless, the types of parameters used to describe 
these capabilities are similar (definition/resolution, endurance, communication links, 
data formats, etc.).  On the other hand, a net-enabled surveillance capability is a 
specific instantiation of the highest level of surveillance capability – the conceptual 
level.  At this highest level, as discussed later in the paper, life cycle is meaningless; 
whereas at lower level of the capability hierarchy, e.g. at platform level or for a 
particular instantiation, life cycles can and do exist.  This further illustrates the point 
that the fractal nature which we assert here really implies family resemblance rather 
than strict self-similarity, i.e. variation between levels is a norm and not an exception. 
 
In TLCM, the C specifies military capability, of which the UK MoD definition is: 
the enduring ability to generate a desired operational outcome or effect, 
and is relative to the threat, physical environment and the contributions of 
coalition partners.5.   
This clearly acknowledges that military capability is context dependent.  TLCM 
requires capability to be managed, over time, by a series of creative activities that 
synthesise a set of fundamental inputs, or components, which are expressed as lines of 
development.  In the UK there are eight Defence Lines of Development (DLOD): 
Training, Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, Concepts & Doctrine, Organisation, 
Information and Logistics (Figure 1a).  The desired capability can only be achieved if 
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the activities within all eight DLOD are at an appropriately matched level of 
readiness, or maturity; failure to manage across all eight DLOD can lead to serious 
deficiencies. For example, failure to deliver Apache Helicopter training to schedule 
resulted in an additional £6M of costs because some delivered aircraft had to be stored 
until trained operators were available6.  The DLOD are concerned with operational 
readiness, i.e. development to a level appropriate for deployment (e.g. training refers 
to the training of military personnel such that the appropriate people are trained to an 
appropriate level of preparedness for deployment). 
    
For a number of reasons, industry has an ever expanding role in the TLCM domain, as 
anticipated by the policy documents referred to above.  Therefore, there is another 
capability of concern, which is industrial capability.  Industrial capability is usually 
described in terms of the five attributes (Figure 1b) of People, Processes, Products, 
Technology, and Facilities7.  Some authors add capitalisation to these attributes, but 
we shall assume appropriate investment for the purposes of this paper. 
Figure 1a: The Eight UK Defence Lines of Development, from MoD Defence 
Acquisition Handbook. 
 
 
Figure 1b: The five attributes of industrial capability. 
 
es
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Industrial capability in TLCM context means the ability to supply the right products 
and services, which may be an integral part of military capability.  For example, some 
industry facilities could form a part of the infrastructure in a military capability.   
Similarly, industry capability in providing logistic support may be used as part of the 
logistic DLOD of a military capability.  Nevertheless, industry cannot deliver military 
capability.  The realisation of capability, through the integration of attributes across 
the DLOD at ‘point of use’ will always be a military task. 
 
From above discussion, it is clear that in the TLCM domain, there are two principal 
kinds of capability of interest; military and industrial capabilities.  They are 
intertwined but distinct.  Hence transforming military capability and transforming 
industrial capability are two different processes, although they are not independent of 
each other. 
 
Network Enabled Capability (NEC) 
NEC was introduced as a war fighting concept that breaks away from the traditional 
stovepiped, hierarchical approach and promotes networking down to the tactical level.  
It articulates a particular way that the UK military seeks to operate in a networked 
environment.  Unfortunately, misconception has been observed in the military 
capability development community and the enabling components have sometimes 
become the dominant consideration.  In recent times, it has not been uncommon to 
hear military capability categorised as either NEC capability or non-NEC capability.  
To overcome this misconception, a new term: Military Capability Enabled by 
Networking (MCEN) was introduced by the MoD8.  In essence, MCEN conveys the 
message that the enabling networking capability is not a military capability in its own 
right; instead it should be a fundamental part of any future military capability and, at 
the same time, exists across military capabilities.  Blair et. al.9 have drawn attention to 
the lack of clarity surrounding the NEC concept and Quintana10 has highlighted the 
concerns in this respect of both Government and industry; further efforts to focus on 
the capability, and not the network, as the system of interest are to be expected.  This 
is likely to be achieved by defining NEC requirements at the more detailed systems 
levels. 
 
The promise of NEC brings many desired characteristics of MCEN, such as 
flexibility, adaptability, agility, reach, lethality, autonomy, etc.  These characteristics 
are the driving requirements for military capability development; hence TLCM and 
MCEN are inextricably linked and the relationship of the TLCM approach to the 
MCEN aspirations demands closer attention. 
 
TLCM 
The official MoD definition of TLCM is: 
 …an approach to the acquisition and in-service management of military 
capability in which every aspect of new and existing military capability is 
planned and managed coherently across all Defence Lines of 
Development (DLOD) from cradle to grave11.   
The same document goes on to clarify that: 
 Since capabilities endure, all capability management is in perpetuity, so 
the ‘through life’ is redundant.  It is still useful to retain it, as it provides a 
reminder that decision making needs to take a long-term perspective.11   
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This long-term perspective, which includes managing the components of capability on 
a whole life basis, requires a fundamental shift of mindset in military capability 
development.  Because we are not able to predict the future to any degree of certainty, 
cost-effective management of what will be future legacy capability components 
demands that we make adaptability a major driver in the planning and designing 
stages.  Capabilities must be designed to co-evolve with their environment and the 
evolution must be supported over a very long time.  Unfortunately, the approaches 
required to plan and design adaptable military capability are largely lacking and so 
this is an urgent area for research; that is to say, it is currently very poorly understood 
or addressed. 
 
If we were to focus onto any military capability and examine the DLOD, we would 
see that each DLOD evolves asynchronously with the others, even when 
hypothetically the capability is kept constant, as illustrated schematically in Figure 2; 
here the tube represents a military capability notionally kept at a constant level over 
time and the coloured dots represent DLOD at three different epochs.  For any desired 
capability level, there are multiple feasible ways of DLOD synthesising; and at any 
particular point of time, the specific content of each DLOD might be different.  For 
example, it might be different equipments to form the same capability.  This is, of 
course, an oversimplification to illustrate the point that there is no unique combination 
of DLOD to provide a given capability.  In fact, military capability is an emergent 
property arising from the interactions of all the DLOD rather than a simple 
superposition of them.  This adds more complexity for military capability 
development, since it is almost impossible to fully plan, predict and understand its 
long-term evolution. 
t1 t2 t3 
Figure 2. A schematic illustration of asynchronous evolution of DLOD within a 
military capability. 
 
It is meaningless to talk about the life cycle of a military capability.  For some DLOD 
the concept of life cycle does not apply (i.e. personnel, concepts and doctrine, and 
information).  For those that it does, it is not the DLOD itself, but the components 
from which it is composed that may have lifecycles, and there may be many at 
different stages.  For instance, a particular capability may include contributions from 
several components from the equipment DLOD, some of which are about to go out of 
service and others that have only just been qualified for use.  The individual 
equipments have a lifecycle (concept to disposal), but the overall capability is 
enduring.  Moreover, the relationship between DLOD and military capabilities is 
many-to-many, i.e. the components of a particular DLOD contributes to more than 
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one military capability.  So developments of military capabilities and DLOD are 
intertwined.  
 
As stated above, capability is latent, and hence needs a host.  Military capability is 
vested in Force Elements at Readiness (FE@R).  A force element is an building block 
of a force structure, for instance a ship, or a company of ground forces; readiness 
implies that those elements that will be able to deploy with planned performance 
levels within a given notice period12.  The more capable a FE@R is, the more variety 
it has to conduct military tasks.  The proper combination of right FE@R conducting 
orchestrated activities enables the generation of desired effects and, in turn, achieves 
objectives.  So when we look through the whole military capability development 
timeline, it is clear that the fundamental building block that we are dealing with is 
FE@R, whereas capability is much more abstract.  Thus, there are two different time 
scales and two distinctive innovations.  The first may be years, or even decades, 
before the actual utilisation of the military capability of concern; future requirements 
are envisaged and the military capability is designed via a conceptual synthesis of all 
of the DLOD.  This design process is often termed Capability Engineering (discussed 
below), which is generally carried out by military capability planners in consultation 
with stakeholders.  The second is run-time compilation and execution, carried out by 
front line commanders when, in a much shorter time scale, the military capability is 
created by specific integration of FE@R.  This, actually generated, military capability 
can be, and usually is, quite different from the original design.  It is worth noting that, 
during the cold war, nations maintained large numbers of FE at comparatively low R, 
because it was believed there would be warning of an impending war giving time to 
improve R; now many nations maintain fewer FE, but maintain more at high R. 
 
Figure 3 is a concept map that summarises the key concepts in TLCM and their 
relationships as discussed above. 
 
Affordability 
Affordability is the motivation at the heart of TLCM, but it provides many and 
significant challenges.  It must be considered by all organisations in the capability 
enterprise and represents a balancing overall across the enterprise.  That is to say that, 
although it is generally considered to be the affordability as defined by the balance of 
investment over time by the customer (MoD), it is actually the balance of need and 
resources over time of all organisations within the enterprise (i.e. customer and 
suppliers).  The basic challenges associated with understanding whole-life costing are 
very significant and there is currently a lack of appropriate data through which models 
can be developed13.  However, the greatest challenges are perhaps those associated 
with the change in relationship needed between customer and suppliers.  
Determination of affordability requires a considerable sharing of information about 
costs, assumptions, objectives, and strategy in a manner that completely changes the 
nature of competition within the defence market. 
 
This very motivation may well prove to be the stumbling block for the proper 
realisation of TLCM. 
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Figure 3. A TLCM concept map 
 
 
Stakeholder identification and system boundary judgement 
 
Capability Engineering generally requires consideration of, so-called, Systems of 
Systems.  There is a lack of agreement about what this term actually means14, but we 
conceive it to describe the situation in which a number of independent systems, which 
are capable of autonomous action and the achievement of whole effects individually, 
act together in a planned, or unplanned fashion, to achieve other effects that are 
unachievable by any of the individual systems acting in isolation.  The importance of 
this concept is that traditionally a systems engineer will be able to draw the system 
boundary for a particular system, but this task becomes considerably more complex 
and ambiguous for a System of Systems.  Both military capability and its acquisition 
can be considered to be problems in Systems of Systems (though at different levels).  
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It is a moot point whether capability engineering means engineering of capabilities, or 
engineering with capabilities.  Using the notion of capability having a fractal, or 
layered, nature, there is a level at which DLODs are brought together to create FE@R; 
i.e. engineering of capabilities.  Above this there is a level at which capabilities are 
built by combining FE@Rs, subordinate capabilities, and high level concepts and 
doctrine; this can be described as engineering with capabilities.  Taylor15 has 
described this latter as being more akin to capability–based planning. 
 
Military capability development covers the whole spectrum of planning, designing, 
acquisition, management and application of military capability.  It is a very complex 
problem and concerns many issues, such as politics, finance, environment, 
management, research and development, project management, engineering, and 
human resources.  There is a large, diverse range of stakeholders besides the 
numerous organisations directly involved.  These organisations exhibit various 
behaviours and the stakeholders all have their own objectives, which are not 
necessarily aligned and may sometimes be conflicting.  In this section, we conduct a 
broad brush stakeholder analysis, and then make a system boundary judgement. 
 
For a first pass at the stakeholder analysis, we consider only stakeholder organisations 
and indicate for each their overall goals, their TLCM objectives and roles, as shown in 
Table 1. We then consider the impact these have on other stakeholders.  Where the 
environment (or context) significantly modifies this impact, this is indicated as shown 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 shows the stakeholder relationships in military capability development and 
an explicit system boundary judgement, where secondary and external stakeholders 
are treated as external environment exerting influence or constraints on the system.  
This system boundary is represented as a dashed line in the diagram.  This is a generic 
representation and the boundary can tighten or relax according to the capability under 
consideration.  For instance, coalition partners must be included sometimes. 
 
This boundary judgement explicitly includes industry as an integral part of the system. 
For this to be effective, it will require reconsideration of how risks are distributed, 
transferred and managed among the components of the system.  The mentality of “us” 
and “them” must be changed and a broader perspective maintained.  A further 
implication of such a wider system boundary is the increased complexity involved in 
TLCM, together with increases in information and knowledge flows (as predicted by 
Ashby’s Law16).  There is a vastly increased stakeholder group that must be 
considered and a corresponding multiplication of the data and information that must 
be managed to achieve the TLCM aims. 
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Stakeholder Goal TLCM Objective TLCM Role 
Electorate, 
journalists, etc 
Many and varied 
 
None 
 
None 
 
Government Defence of national 
interests 
Maintain armed 
forces at a level 
necessary to 
achieve national 
defence and foreign 
policy needs 
Govern available 
funds over time and 
provide political 
and ethical 
environment for 
management of 
defence 
MoD - Capability 
Developer 
Execute 
government policy 
with respect to 
defence 
Manage funds and 
integrated 
capability over 
time 
Management and 
planning of defence 
system (capability) 
 
MoD - Warfighter Prosecute military 
objectives in 
support of 
government policy 
Maintain 
appropriately 
interoperable 
systems to support 
warfighting role, 
and ensure 
availability of 
resources to 
achieve warfighting 
objectives 
Provide 
information to 
ensure TL planning 
and management of 
deployed capability 
 
Coalition defence 
departments 
Own national 
objectives 
Own national 
objectives 
Define, comply 
with international 
standards for 
interoperability 
Industry - Prime Commercial 
success 
Achieve 
commercial success 
through long term 
provision, 
management, of 
capability 
Service/product 
provider; 
integration of lower 
level systems into 
capability systems 
Industry - lower 
tiers 
Commercial 
success 
Achieve 
commercial success 
through provision 
of services and 
products within 
supply chain 
Suppliers of 
products and 
services that 
support capability 
 
 
 
Table 1 Stakeholder analysis summary 
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Figure 4 Some significant stakeholder relationships in military capability 
development 
 
 
Understanding the UK military capability planning process 
 
This section discusses the official military capability planning processes in UK MoD.  
Figure 5 shows a concept map of the broad capability management scheme, which is 
the front end, i.e. planning stage, of the TLCM.  Figure 6 deals with more details of 
the six step capability planning process as articulated in the Capability Management 
Handbook17. 
 
In the map of Figure 5, yellow indicates critical input documents to the capability 
management process; purple indicates important documents generated as outputs of 
the process; green indicates different MoD internal players involved in the process, 
and the blue oval indicates a terminology that is currently lacking an agreed 
definition: capability engineering. This lack leads to confusion and may lead to 
misunderstandings.  The MoD acquisition operating Framework uses capability 
engineering synonymously with TLCM18, whereas within the defence research 
community, especially in The Technology Cooperation Program (TTCP), capability 
engineering concerns designing options, which synthesise all DLOD to meet 
requirements for a particular capability.  It is the authors’ judgement that the latter use 
of capability engineering is aligned with capability planning, which is depicted in 
Figure 6.  TTCP19 is a government to government organisation for information 
exchange in defence science and technology between Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States. 
 
The map in Figure 5 gives a glimpse of the complexity involved, especially when it is 
borne in mind that there are multiple CPGs and CMGs.  Another complication, not 
shown in the diagram, is the existence of different budget lines. 
Electorate, 
Journalists 
etc.
Government
MoD –
Capability 
Developer
MoD -
Warfighter
Coalition 
Defence 
Depts.
Industry 
Primes
Industry 
lower tiers
Value for money
Moral influences on 
spending and 
Defence activities Set defence and foreign 
policy objectives and set  
budget and political/ 
ethical context for 
decisions
Place interoperability 
requirements at technical 
and force level
Provision of defence 
systems (components of 
capability) across DLODs
Balanc
e defen
ce spe
nding 
agains
t other
 public
 servic
es
Legacy capability compts.
Available funding
Available capability and 
adequate resources
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AWG = Availability Working Group;  
CMG = Capability Management Group;  
CPG = Capability Planning Group;  
DEC = Directorate of Equipment Capability;  
DE&S = Defence Equipment and Support;  
IPT = Integrated Project Team;  
JCB = Joint Capabilities Board;  
S&T = Science and Technology Community;  
TLB = Top Level Budget Holder;  
 
Figure 5. A capability management concept map 
 
One aspect of the planning, which is not obvious from the maps, is that it is iterative, 
and the output of the planning – capability change programme, is a rolling 
programme.  However, one drawback of the process is that a learning mechanism is 
not explicitly built in.  This is a crucial deficit where TLCM is concerned as effective 
learning has a significant impact on affordability. 
 
A critical factor which will determine whether the planning is successful is how to 
measure a military capability.  If wrong measures are adopted, no matter how robust 
the process is, the end result will still be disastrous.  However, measuring capability is 
very difficult and our current knowledge in this area is dreadfully limited. 
 
There is no doubt that military capability planning processes are knowledge intensive, 
hence a knowledge management perspective will definitely be helpful in the 
implementation and improvement of them.  A shared mental model and common 
language will be a good starting point.  The concept maps presented in this paper can 
identifies 
identifies 
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be used to communicate the complex ideas in the domain and assist meaningful 
debate and discussions. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. A concept map for the 6-stage capability planning process 
 
The level of industrial involvement is not well defined in the process.  It has been 
suggested (e.g. Daw20) that industry is a ninth line of development.  Industry 
capability is an important consideration for maintaining sovereign skills and abilities, 
but for planning purposes, it is probably more important to understand the role of 
industry in supporting DLOD for any particular capability and the 
alignment/relationship between supplier and customer in developing the DLOD. 
 
The 6-stage process shown in Figure 6 addressed planning at the individual capability 
level.  On top of this (at the JCB level) strategic balance of investment decisions must 
be made in a financially constrained environment, as shown in Figure 5.  When 
evaluating options, the high uncertainty of the external environment means that 
flexibility and adaptability must enter this decision process with a higher weighting 
than has traditionally been the case.  Partially reversible decisions will need to be 
considered and a portfolio management approach may have merit.  A further change 
to the basis for decision making concerns the balance of efficiency and agility.  The 
tightened budgetary environment will tend to promote the mantra lean and efficient, 
whereas solutions with greater opportunity to adapt in an agile fashion will likely 
provide the more cost effective approach over the long term. Research shows that 
when the resource and opportunities to explore for probable future benefits are 
removed, the system dies21.    This is to say that systems that cannot readily adapt to a 
changing environment do not survive. 
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Summary 
 
Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) is the key theme of recent UK 
government defence policy documents, but the implications of this are not yet fully 
understood. This is, at least partly, because of different understandings of important 
concepts within the community.  We emphasise here that capability must be 
considered at different levels and is fractal in nature.  TLCM and the realisation of 
NEC cannot be considered independently, in fact they are intrinsically linked, and 
effective realisation is only possible if an holistic view is taken of UK military 
capability development.  Such a view is attempted in this paper and we have described 
this approach as capability engineering; a term that is increasingly being used to 
express the System of Systems considerations necessary to manage capability over 
very long timescales.  The fractal nature of capability, we suggest, clarifies the 
meaning of capability engineering as being concerned with the engineering of 
capabilities, whereas engineering with capabilities can be described as capability-
based planning. 
 
We have also noted that a lack of clarity about the meaning of the NEC concept has 
had a detrimental effect on its realisation, but this is likely to be addressed through a 
focus on capability, rather than on the network, as the system of interest. 
 
Through the development of concept maps for TLCM and the recognised capability 
development process, and through a consideration of the stakeholders, we have 
extracted some important principles for TLCM and also identified some stumbling 
blocks that must be overcome if TLCM is truly to be realised.  These effectively set a 
research agenda. 
 
Affordability is the motivation for TLCM but whole-life costing is still a very 
significant challenge and, furthermore, affordability demands much greater sharing of 
information within the defence enterprise.  This will require a significant change to 
the commercial arrangements for defence procurement, as well as the development of 
trusted models for whole life costing. 
 
The role of industry as a contributor across all eight defence lines of development has 
been acknowledged explicitly in various government documents, but our capability 
management concept map (Figure 5) reveals that the structures are not yet in place to 
benefit from industry’s participation.  The six-stage capability planning process 
(Figure 6) does not have a learning mechanism explicitly built in, and this is of major 
concern because TLCM will rely on effective knowledge management.  Agility and 
adaptability criteria must be given a higher priority at both the individual capability 
level and overall decision making in generating the capability change programme.  
Research is needed into planning and designing for adaptability in military capability.  
Finally, there is a clear need for the development of appropriate metrics for TLCM. 
 
TLCM requires significant changes in the roles of UK MoD and industry and in the 
approaches that are taken in the planning, development and management of military 
capability.  Through an holistic view of UK military capability development we have 
identified some of the challenges, and the concept maps presented above will be 
useful for understanding the nature of the changes needed to address them. 
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